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Abstract 
This paper presents tools and equipment aspects of the results from a three-year 
United Kingdom Government-funded research project investigating accident causality 
(ConCA).  The project has used focus groups and studied in detail 100 construction 
accidents site audits, interviews with involved persons and follow-up along the causal 
chain.  This paper concentrates on the influence of construction tools and equipment 
which were found to be important contributory factors identified by the research.  
They have largely been overlooked by previous studies and are not typically 
acknowledged as accident contributors.  This paper argues for further work to confirm 
these links and for the inclusion of tools and equipment in the list of categories in 
statutory reporting procedures.  This would also require an increased 
acknowledgement by construction managers of their influence, leading to better 
design and management of their supply and care on site.   
Key Words  construction accident causality; tools; equipment; PPE 
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1 Introduction and Method 
Are accidents really accidental or are they ‘caused’ by something?  Most experts 
concur with the latter view, although there are differing opinions regarding the nature 
of causes and their relationship (Whittington et al, 1992; Hinze, 1996; Abdelhamid 
and Everett, 2000; Suraji et al, 2000).  A full discussion of these approaches is outside 
the scope of this paper, however, there is no doubt that the most appropriate approach 
is to accept multiple causality (Reason, 1990).  This paper argues that tools and 
equipment should be included in these multi-causal influences although they are often 
missed in accident reporting regimes. 
 
This paper presents findings relating to tools and equipment from ConCA - a three-
year project studying accident causality in construction and funded by the United 
Kingdom (UK) Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Government body 
responsible for health and safety.  The full report has been published by the HSE 
(Haslam et al, 2003), identifying a number of causal factors under the following 
headings: 
 Worker factors 
 Site factors 
 Materials, tools and equipment factors 
 Underlying causes 
 
This paper concentrates on tools and equipment aspects.  Interested readers should 
view the full report for a complete coverage of method and results.  Other aspects of 
this work have also been published elsewhere (Haslam et al, 2005; Hide et al, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003).   
 
The ConCA project emphasis was on an holistic, qualitative study of accident 
causality, concentrating on depth over breadth and recognising that there is a montage 
of proximal and distal factors in construction accidents.  Following a thorough 
literature review, seven focus groups were used to identify broad areas of interest and 
to help formulate the research instruments for the accident studies.  The groups 
comprised 5-7 participants in the following categories: client team; senior managers; 
site managers; operatives (2 groups); safety professionals and a mixed group. 
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Focus Groups 
Review 
Incident identification 
Site inspection 
Prelim report 
Follow-up 
Independent review 
Analysis 
Incorporation 
Site interviews
 
100 accidents were then studied in detail, to collect further evidence.  The accidents 
were a convenient sample with collaborating companies contacting the research team 
with initial information.  Sampling was done on a quota basis to ensure a spread of 
accidents across construction build type and Government reporting accident 
categories.  Initial reports were drawn up following site-based ‘eye-witness’ 
interviews and observations.  These were evaluated by an independent expert review 
team and follow-up areas were identified.  These leads were then investigated with 
further face to face or phone interviews.  Finally an analysis of each accident was 
completed and incorporated within the overall project analysis which led to the 
published report (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 ConCA method (adapted from Hide et al, 2003) 
 
The 100 accidents studied were used as a platform to explore the spectrum of causal 
factors which, by their nature, become less ‘hard’ the further they are away from the 
incident.  The clear intention was not to lay blame, but rather to investigate possible 
causes and influences relating to each accident.  The measure therefore, was not 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, but rather ‘with reasonable confidence’.   
 
This paper has been developed from a presentation at the international conference of 
the International Council for Research and Innovation in Building and Construction 
(cib W99), Sao Paulo, 2003 (Hide et al, 2003). 
 
2 Accident Causality – The Loughborough ConCA model 
The ConCA project has produced a causality model (Figure 2), that presents the 
factors influencing accidents on three planes, namely: immediate accident 
circumstances, shaping factors and originating influences.  These planes can also be 
viewed in a similar way to Suraji et al’s (2001) proximal and distal causes, in that 
they move from the more immediate and more easily demonstrable aspects, further 
along the causal chain where the links become more fuzzy and harder to firmly 
establish.  As explained earlier, the concept of ‘with reasonable confidence’ was used 
to determine these more distal causes. 
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Figure 2 Loughborough’s ConCA construction accident causality model 
(adapted from Haslam et al, 2003) 
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3   Tools and equipment issues raised by the focus groups 
3.1 Focus group method 
 
The aim of the seven focus groups was to consult stakeholders in the construction 
industry, exploring where failure occurs and why accidents still happen.  A focus 
group is a style of group interview whereby the data obtained arises from the 
interaction and discussion generated from within the group (Morgan and Krueger, 
1998).  Groups are guided by a moderator, with a style that can be more or less 
directive, depending on the nature and purpose of the investigation.  A degree of 
caution interpreting focus group findings is required.  For example, groups may 
generate a level of conformity and acquiescence, suppressing individual views that 
might be felt in private.  Alternatively, the researcher may direct discussion into an 
area unimportant to participants, or achieve this through data interpretation.  
Nonetheless, focus groups are an established method for gaining insight into views 
surrounding a research question. 
 
Table 1 describes the group categories and participants.  Design professionals were 
not adequately represented in the focus group exercise and this is acknowledged as a 
limitation for this phase.  However, designers were interviewed as part of the accident 
studies themselves.  Each group considered where failure occurs and why accidents 
still happen, with the discussion covering project concept, design and procurement, 
work organisation & management, task factors and individual factors.  The groups 
were considering these issues from a generic perspective which was not based on 
knowledge or data from the subsequent accident studies. 
 
Table 1 Focus Group categories and participants 
Group Participants 
 
Client team Client advisors, most with health and safety 
responsibilities1 
 
Senior managers Senior staff from general and specialist contractors 
representing civil engineering, major building and 
residential 
 
Site managers Mix of general supervisory and managerial staff, some with 
specific health & safety responsibilities 
 
Workers Two groups representing large and small sites from skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled backgrounds 
Safety professionals Industrial safety professionals and enforcement officers 
 
Mixed A mixed discipline group (trades and professionals) 
 
 
                                                 
1 This group included Planning Supervisors who have a specific responsibility in UK legislation to 
coordinate health & safety aspects, particularly through the design phase. 
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The groups lasted about 1½ hours and audio recordings were made to permit 
subsequent transcription.  An abridged transcription was made from each audiotape, 
recording the main points made as each participant spoke.  This included a number of 
quotes where these were clear and salient points.  To facilitate interpretation of the 
transcriptions, intermediate analyses were undertaken which involved summarisation 
of all text into short bullet point statements.  These were a subjective interpretation by 
the researcher of the main points of what the speaker was saying.  This enabled 
significant points to be extracted and permitted later comparison and categorisation of 
information according to the discussion area headings and sub-headings. 
 
3.2 Focus group findings on tools and equipment 
 
Although it was generally acknowledged that, where provided by the Principal 
Contractor, tools were often good and new to each site, it was indicated, that their 
selection was too cost motivated and that they were not always freely available. 
Equipment was reported as not always being of a good quality and that there were 
problems with the selection of the correct capacity tooling and providing adequate 
maintenance (directed in particular to lifting equipment).  There were some concerns 
about the unknown quality of tools and equipment that was used by sub-contractors 
and of the use of multi-functional equipment, where tools are adapted for various uses 
other than that for which they were originally intended.  One example, relevant to 
sub-contractor tool-use, was that, to compensate for unknown site circumstances, they 
are known to bring their largest capacity equipment to site, and proceed with using 
this although the equipment may in fact be too large for the task. 
 
Availability and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was reported to vary 
widely.  The impression gained was that for larger companies there were plentiful 
supplies, but for smaller companies availability was limited and in some cases 
operatives were expected to provide their own PPE.  It was acknowledged that non-
use of correct PPE does occur and, although this is more likely to happen at the week-
end, use was seen as an individual’s responsibility.  It was indicated that those 
advocating the use of PPE do not adequately appreciate the practicalities and potential 
negative influence upon performance from its wear.  For example, loss of mobility; 
helmets that impede vision and fall off unless secured by ear muffs; and goggles that 
steam up frequently interrupting work in order to clean them. 
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4 Tools and equipment issues raised by the accident studies 
4.1 Accident study method and sample description 
 
The study method for the 100 accidents can be summarised as follows: 
1. Obtain details of the incident and evaluate against sample frame2 
2. Visit site and interview involved persons 
3. Interview supervisors, managers, H&S staff (as appropriate) 
4. Draft initial study report 
5. Review report by independent expert panels to identify potential follow-up 
6. Follow-up studies (generally off-site) 
7. Complete accident study report 
 
One of the limitations of the study was that HSE (the UK Government health & safety 
enforcer  who was funding the project) stipulated that, for legal reasons, none of the 
accident studies should involve incidents that were being, or were likely to be 
investigated by the HSE.  This meant that the study’s accident outcomes were fairly 
minor in nature.  It was therefore necessary to do an additional exercise to establish 
the likelihood that these accidents could have resulted in more severe consequences.  
In this way, almost a third of the incidents were judged to have had the potential to 
have caused a fatality and more than a half could have been classified as major events 
under the UK legislation RIDDOR3.  This aspect is covered later in the paper and in 
detail in the HSE report (Haslam et al, 2003).   
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the accidents studied by construction sector.  It can 
be seen that civil engineering was over-represented, while the residential sector was 
under-represented against the original targets.  Nevertheless, the table shows that the 
accidents occurred across the range of industry sectors.   
 
Table 2 Distribution of the accidents studied (n=100) 
 Engineering 
construction 
Civil 
engineering 
Major 
building 
Residential 
Target 5 15 45 35 
Result 4 25 49 22 
 
There was wide variation in the details of participating sites, ranging from short 
contract work to major building projects, being undertaken over a number of years.  
All but 16 of the sites were brownfield (4 unknown/missing data).  Sites varied 
considerably in size, accommodating between 7-2500 personnel and with build 
schedules varying between 1 week to more than 10 years.  From the 100 accidents, 71 
                                                 
2 A sample frame was developed from the focus group and other expert input and knowledge such 
as the categories of accidents from existing accident statistics – these were used to draw up a matrix of 
project and accident characteristics.  The ConCA project was seeking a spread of characteristics across 
this sample frame.  This is explained in more detail in the HSE report (Haslam et al, 2003). 
3 RIDDOR – UK legislation  - Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations (http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse31.pdf).  Major injuries would include fractures, 
amputation, loss of sight, unconsciousness and acute illness requiring medical treatment. 
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projects were reported to be running to time, 1 was ahead and 18 were behind 
schedule (10 unknown/missing data).  Four of the sites were undertaking concurrent 
phases of their work, whereas 11 were in the ‘start’ phase, 58 in the ‘middle’ phase, 9 
between ‘middle’ and ‘end’ phases, 7 in the ‘end’ phase and 2 in the ‘after’ phase (9 
unknown/missing data).  4 projects included refurbishment activities.  Many of the 
main UK principal contractors were represented.   
 
The contract types were as follows: 
 design and build / contractor led – including residential developers (n=31) 
 integrated eg partnering / PFI4 / alliancing (n=24) 
 lump sum / fixed price / design then build (n=14) 
 construction management (n=13) 
 other contract types (n=4) 
 unknown i.e. not identified in the accident study (n=14) 
 
4.2 Accident circumstances  
 
Based on the accident book entries, in the opinion of the researchers, twelve of the 
100 accidents should actually have been reported to the authorities under UK 
regulations.  Of these, three were dangerous occurrences, eight resulted in absences of 
over 3 days and one was a major accident.  The accidents were grouped according to 
conventional HSE categories (
                                                 
4 PFI – Private Finance Initiative – a collaborative approach used in the UK to obtain private 
finance for major projects that would otherwise have been funded by the Government. 
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Table 3) (revised to combine slips, trips and all falls data together) with an additional 
category for ‘injuries directly involving materials, tools or equipment’ as this was 
found to be an important category that is not currently included by the authorities. 12 
of the accidents were included in this category.  In addition a further 5 were 
categorised as ‘contact with/by moving machinery’ and 5 as ‘trapped by’.  Both of 
these categories cover aspects addressed by this paper. 
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Table 3 Distribution of accident types (n=100) 
Category Accidents number 
reported 
Total 
Slips, trips and falls (all levels) 16, 17, 23, 36, 37, 46, 
47, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 
62, 64, 73, 75, 77, 81, 
86, 88, 100 
 
21 
Injured while handling, lifting or carrying 5, 14, 15, 28, 29, 31, 33, 
34, 38, 39, 48, 50, 56, 
57, 76, 83, 84 
 
17 
Struck by moving (+ flying / falling) object 1, 4, 9, 19, 24, 32, 35, 
43, 44, 61, 63, 68, 69, 
78, 89, 93, 96, 97 
 
18 
Injuries directly involving materials, tools or 
equipment 
7, 26, 30, 49, 59, 74, 80, 
87, 92, 95, 98, 99 
 
12 
Strike against something fixed or stationary 6, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 82, 
91 
 
8 
Dangerous occurrences 3, 10, 11, 20 
 
4 
Contact with/by moving machinery 2, 12, 13, 42, 85 
 
5 
Trapped by something collapsing or overturning 60, 65, 70, 72, 90 
 
5 
Contact with electricity or electrical discharge 52, 71 
 
2 
Other accident events types 
 
8, 40, 41, 45, 66, 67, 79, 
94 
8 
 
Following the studies, the pattern of involvement of tools, equipment, materials and 
site / structure, along with the nature of the task or activity being undertaken at the 
time of the accident were analysed (Table 4).  This further analysis showed that 28 
accidents involved plant or equipment and 17 involved tools. 
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Table 4 Activities and involved items within the accident sample (n=100) 
 Tools Plant / 
equipment 
Materials Site / 
structure 
Total 
Setting-up  31, 42, 74 
 
34 16, 67, 73 7 
Actual task 
activity 
2, 3, 7, 13, 
14, 26, 30, 
39, 49, 59, 
65, 87, 89, 
97, 99 
 
8, 11, 29, 
38, 60, 71, 
94, 79 
5, 9, 10, 15, 
33, 35, 40, 
43, 45, 48, 
57, 63, 80, 
84, 95, 96 
20, 24, 27, 
28, 52, 55, 
58, 61, 77, 
78, 91, 92, 
93 
52 
 
Clear-up / 
maintenance 
98 
 
 
4, 12, 21, 
32, 46, 56 
54, 66, 70, 
83 
82 12 
Movement / 
transit5 
50 6, 17, 19, 
22, 36, 37, 
41, 51, 62, 
85, 90 
1, 25, 44 18, 23, 47, 
53, 64, 68, 
69, 72, 75, 
76, 81, 86, 
88, 100 
 
29 
Total 17 28 24 31 100 
 
4.3 Accident consequences 
 
As mentioned earlier, the limitations on the accident sample meant that most of the 
accidents studied had outcomes that were not reportable under the UK regulations 
(RIDDOR6).  To consider the significance of the research findings an exercise was 
completed to propose potential outcomes (Figure 3).  These were established as 
‘likely’ and ‘possible’ based on the RIDDOR classification.  This rationale relied on 
an evaluation of the incident information and evaluation of alternative outcomes if the 
injured person had been in a slightly different location or if a different part of the 
body had been involved.  Likely outcomes would require only a minor change in 
circumstances; possible outcomes would require a number of circumstances to change 
for them to occur.  Some of the ‘major’ incidents may have led to permanent 
disability and hence loss of the individual to the industry.  With a modest change in 
circumstances, it is likely that almost three-quarters of the accidents could have 
resulted in absences of more than three days and almost a quarter could easily have 
been major incidents.  It is also likely that between 2 and 6 accidents could have 
resulted in fatalities.  With a greater change in circumstances, the almost a third of the 
accidents could have resulted in fatalities and more than half would have been 
classified as major. 
                                                 
5 Movement/transit here only includes on-site aspects.  Travel to and from the place of work was 
not included in this study as it is not included in UK work-related legislation or statistics. 
6 RIDDOR – UK legislation  - Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations (http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse31.pdf) 
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Figure 3 Likely and possible accident outcomes 
4.4 Analysis of causes 
 
Following the completion of the 100 accident study reports, further analysis was 
performed by the research team, combining construction and ergonomics expertise, 
based on their judgement of ‘reasonable confidence’ that a factor was causal in an 
accident.  It should be borne in mind that was easier to be confident concerning the 
involvement of more immediate factors, eg worker actions or site hazards, than wider 
influences, such as safety culture.  This is because the action of the immediate factors 
was direct and more obvious, while the involvement of other influences was more 
subtle.  A summary of the findings from this further analysis is presented in Table 5 
with 56 accidents now being found to be linked to tools and equipment. 
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Table 5 Summary of accident causes 
 
Category 
 
 
Causal Factor 
 
Number of accidents 
Worker & 
Work 
Team 
worker actions/behaviour 49  
 
70 
worker capabilities (including 
knowledge/skills) 
42 
communication 7 
immediate supervision 13 
worker health/fatigue 5 
    
Workplace site conditions (excluding equipment, 
materials, weather) 
11  
 
49 site layout/space 15 
working environment (lighting/noise/hot/cold/ 
wet) 
9 
work scheduling 11 
housekeeping 19 
    
Materials suitability of materials 12  
27 usability of materials 8 
condition of materials 13 
    
Tools and 
Equipment 
suitability of tools or equipment 44  
56 usability of tools or equipment 19 
condition of tools or equipment 12 
    
Originating 
Influences 
permanent works design 27  
 
94 
project management 24 
construction processes 12 
safety culture 15 
risk management 84 
 
4.5 Tools issues from the accident studies 
 
An assortment of tools featured in the accident studies, ranging from simple hand 
tools through to more sophisticated or powered tooling.  Shortcomings in function or 
performance were reported by interviewees, with further problems with tool design 
observed by the researchers.  Typical failings included poor grip characteristics, 
undesirable pressure at skin contact points and, for powered tools, frequent use of 
finger trigger operation.  Some tools also appeared heavy, given the situations in 
which they were being used.  For example, the petrol-powered circular saw and 
torque multipliers used in two of the accidents each weighed 11.5kg and 8.9kg, heavy 
loads when used in awkward postures.  It was observed that attempts to reduce 
problems with tools had been made by users through the addition of padding or tape 
on handles.  Bladed tools required frequent unprotected handling of the cutting edge 
to change blades or to remove obstructions.  One accident involved an electrocution 
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due to deficiencies with the operation of a CAT scanner which failed to identify 
buried services.  Time saving seemed to be an issue in tool use for other accidents.   
 
A kerb lifter is available, but by the time you get it it’s easier to use two people at 
each end...7 
 
…The saw was quite a heavy and bulky tool for cutting the pipes, but a handsaw 
would have taken forever … 
 
Interesting comments were made about criteria for tool purchasing.  The self-
employed often provided their own tools, although it was also reported that self-
purchase was sometimes preferable anyway due to the poor quality and condition of 
equipment supplied on site.  In describing factors affecting their purchase choice, 
most interviewees seemed to aim for a ‘middle of the road’ price and selection 
according to manufacturer.   
 
… Tools in the £15-408 price range are all pretty much the same … 
 
Tool pricing was a concern for many, especially when the tools were vulnerable to 
theft, or had a short life-span.  In one case the tool performance (non-rusting) was 
referred to as a purchasing criterion.  Interviewees obtained their tools from a 
specialist supplier or through mail-order catalogues.  Some interviewees had been 
trained in use and care of their tools, but rarely since their apprenticeship.  Others felt 
that they had just picked it up as they went along or relied solely on suppliers’ 
information.  Instructions were sometimes considered unhelpful and left unread.  
Specific training in tool use was rare – with safe use often considered to be common 
sense. 
4.6 Equipment issues from the accident studies 
 
Equipment, including machinery or plant brought onto site, was identified as deficient 
in more than half of the accident studies and in all cases was directly involved in the 
adverse incident.  Failures relating to equipment included problems resulting from 
inadequacies in dimensions for user anthropometry or with the user interface.  These 
problems were further compounded by shortcomings in performance, maintenance 
and safety-related features.  Inappropriate physical dimensions of some equipment 
resulted in user interaction, such as physical or visual access, being hampered.  In one 
accident a jump was required to climb off a scissor lift.  Inspection of the equipment 
revealed that there were no distinct handholds on this equipment to support the user in 
this action.   The safety cage on top of the scissor lift offered the most convenient 
points to grasp (at 2.2m from the ground), yet fixing bolts here were left exposed, 
compromising the only handhold available.   
 
… We are taught to come down the scissor lift steps backwards, but the last step is 
about 2ft from the ground, so you have to jump the last bit … 
 
 
                                                 
7 These quotes have been taken from interviews of eye-witnesses to the incidents. 
8 ~ 25-67 Euro 
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A related problem occurred in connection with the length of ladder attached to the 
side of a rail wagon (Figure 4) which was being used to haul excavation spoil from a 
rail construction project.  Elsewhere, use of split or cut down ladders was reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Inadequate ladder access to rail wagon 
In a similar context, problems were identified with the use of scaffold towers.  In 
some instances difficulties had been experienced in achieving a desirable scaffold and 
handrail height for the work requirements, given the fixed height scaffold components 
available.  Another example, commented upon spontaneously by interviewees in a 
number of accident studies, concerned the small size of access opening between 
different scaffolding levels.  This access space was frequently too small for larger 
individuals, or those that might be carrying items about their person. 
 
Problems had also arisen with operations involving manual movement of loads.  In 
one case, load instability existed due to free movement of fuel within a fuel bowser.  
This situation was exacerbated by the design of the adjustable ‘jockey’ wheel at the 
front on the bowser (Figure 5).  The fuel moved and caused the bowser to topple – the 
locking mechanism on the jockey wheel did not prevent the instability. 
 
Figure 5 ‘Jockey wheel’ failure on fuel bowser 
 
Whilst climbing ladder to 
view rail wagon contents, IP 
injured hand on top of wagon 
which had been damaged by 
a excavator loading spoil 
material into the wagon 
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The design did not ‘fail-safe’ and had not utilised good practice from similar 
situations in other applications.  For example, a very similar situation occurs in the 
caravan (small mobile homes) market in the UK, but in this case the design of the 
jockey wheel is much more sophisticated and the vehicle does not fall if the winder 
mechanism is incorrectly used. 
 
In another accident, problems occurred manoeuvring a laden plasterboard trolley 
(Figure 6).  The trolley had directional wheels at only one end (the other end having 
fixed forward facing wheels).  While it was not known which end of the trolley was 
leading, difficulties were to be expected moving a full load with this particular trolley 
design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Plasterboard trolley manual handling incident 
Equipment maintenance deficiencies featured in several accidents, especially with 
respect to steel parts (such as scaffold clips, concrete pipe clamps and extendable steel 
props).  Weathering and concrete spillages on the equipment were reported as the 
main antagonists.  Although ‘regular cleaning and maintenance programmes’ were in 
place, overcoming rust and similar problems added to the physical effort required to 
use equipment.  Examples were found where the design of equipment gave little heed 
to its usability or how the user might detect and monitor different states.  Figure 7 
shows concrete placement pump and pipeline, where an operative injured his foot 
attempting to secure a pipe connection clip that had become excessively stiff due to 
concrete contamination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IP’s hand was crushed 
against an adjacent 
scaffold handrail 
whilst removing 
plasterboard sheets 
from a fully loaded 
trolley. 
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Figure 7 Concrete pump connection problems 
 
Another accident involved an operative, whilst maintaining a crawler-mounted crane, 
falling from the running boards as the handle from the maintenance hatch gave way.  
Lack of feedback (eg visual, auditory or tactile information to the user) status of the 
equipment was a factor in several accidents.  One accident involved a fire caused by 
an electrical fault on a pneumatic breaker which the supervisor considered had been 
caused by misuse of the equipment, but this damage had not been obvious to the 
operatives involved.   
 
Usability issues were reported, for instance in the overturning of a delivery lorry 
where the interviewee described the wide range of lorry types he used in his work.  
There were common features however, such as the crane controls, but it was apparent 
that their design contravened user expectations (pushing the lever down raised the 
crane and vice versa).  It was also reported that safety protection features built into the 
equipment did not anticipate this particular accident event.   
 
Suitability of equipment was an issue in a number of accidents, where machines were 
being used for activities other then their primary purpose (eg excavators or forklifts 
used instead of cranes). 
 
4.7 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) issues from the accident studies 
 
The use of a safety helmet, high visibility vest and safety boots was mandatory on all 
sites visited, with supplementary use of protective eyewear, gloves, harnesses and 
respiratory protective equipment expected depending on task type.  Adverse 
comments were made about PPE in a large number of the accident studies.  Criticisms 
related to poor fit and comfort; inappropriateness for actual task requirements; poor 
quality, care or condition; problems with availability and excessive cost. 
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Comments concerning safety helmets focused on their frequent poor fit and comfort.  
Remarks were made about the lack of lining or padding, insecurity (due to lack of a 
chinstrap), poor ventilation (especially in summer) and being too small.  Interviewees 
reported that helmets were regularly dislodged or fell off, induced headaches and 
interfered with work on looking up.  In two of the accidents the injured persons’ 
helmet fell off when they bent down, both then struck their head on something when 
they stood up. 
 
Many interviewees accepted or were resigned to wearing a safety helmet, seeing them 
as a ‘necessary evil’ and in a number of the accidents helmets helped to reduce the 
extent of the injury.  However, it was also said that they are not always needed, with 
some frustration at the lack of flexibility over when helmets needed to be worn.  This 
seemed to suggest that, on some sites, there was an over-concentration on mandatory 
wearing of PPE (especially helmets) irrespective of the prevalent risks, whereas other 
risks were not always addressed.  Figure 8 illustrates this point, with operatives 
rendering the external walls of a building wearing full PPE, including site helmets, 
although there is very little risk of anything falling on them.  Whilst, in contrast, the 
very real danger of falling from a height of around 20 metres was not addressed in 
that no handrail is provided to their access scaffold.  If they fell from this height their 
helmet would almost certainly fall off, and even if it did not, it would not prevent 
them from serious injury or, more likely, death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Helmets worn but handrail missing 
 
In many of the accidents where the hands were at risk, the injured person was not 
wearing protective gloves.  There were also complaints about the comfort and fit of 
gloves, with operatives not wearing them as they interfered with ability to operate 
tools and the speed with which they could undertake their work.  Operatives reported 
inadequate supplies of gloves (necessitating use of worn out protection), inadequate 
durability and lack of a suitable size range.  There were also reports that gloves were 
frequently mislaid with constant taking off and putting on.  In some cases the gloves 
worn were not adequate to provide protection from the risk. 
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Fall arrest harnesses were identified as issues in a small number of accident studies 
(only specified trades require use of this PPE), yet in these cases, there was a 
consensus of criticism about the equipment.  These included complaints about 
comfort and fit (especially when used for longer than 30 minutes), concerns about 
restriction of mobility and inadequate supplies (leading to harness hoarding among 
site operatives).  Interviewees were also worried that the 2-metre lanyard length was 
inadequate and that they would experience physical injury from the harness itself 
should they experience a fall.  As with other PPE, it was acknowledged that harness 
use was necessary, but interviewees felt that they should be permitted greater 
discretion over when to wear fall arrest equipment. 
 
With regard to other PPE, protective eye-wear was said to steam up and cause 
difficulties when performing certain tasks and under particular lighting conditions.  
There were problems with protective eye-wear for those needing to use ‘prescription’ 
glasses, although suitable prescription safety glasses are available.  Respiratory 
protective equipment users mentioned problems with fatigue and being impeded when 
undertaking certain operations.  There were also some complaints about high-
visibility vests, concerning the obstruction they pose when trying to access tools from 
waist belts and a lack of fabric breathability, causing discomfort in hot weather. 
 
Many interviewees reported having to buy their own protective footwear and in one 
case another reported purchasing his own protective eyewear.  Interviewees reported 
receiving little instruction as to the maintenance of their PPE, although when asked 
about this respondents thought that care was ‘down to the individual’, or instruction 
unnecessary as they had used it for a long time.   
 
Interviews with supervisor/managers indicated that PPE and its availability were 
viewed differently than by the workers themselves.  These respondents were 
concerned about the lack of care given to PPE, with reports of finding new and 
expensive PPE treated badly, left lying around or improperly looked after.  Ordering 
and choice of PPE was, in a number of instances, undertaken by ‘Head Office’, 
although in other cases supervisor/managers were involved.  Only a few had tried 
ordering new styles, prompted by recommendation, observation of use by other 
construction teams, or through information provided in supply catalogues.  One 
interviewee reported working with glove manufacturers to trial new products and 
another, in the case of a new short peaked hat, had tried it themselves to assess the 
product.   
 
Whilst there were instances of operatives claiming that PPE impeded their work, there 
was no evidence in the studies to suggest that the enforced wearing of PPE caused the 
wearers to take more risk.  This is contrary to the suggestions of Aranda & Finch 
(2003) quoting the risk homeostasis theories of Wilde (1988) and Yates (1992). 
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5 Conclusions 
The ConCA project has shown that tools and equipment, including PPE, were an 
important causal factor in the 100 construction accidents studied.  The number of 
accidents with causal links to tools and equipment increased as a closer study along 
the causal chain was completed (Accident book 12; initial site-based study 45; further 
analysis 56).   
 
ConCA argues that a category should be added to the statutory reporting procedures 
to record the involvement of tools and equipment in accidents.  In this way their 
contribution to accident causality can be properly evaluated.  In the meantime, all 
involved in the construction process should look to improve communication and 
feedback loops with tools and equipment designers and suppliers.  Companies should 
carefully evaluate tools chosen and ensure that lowest cost is not the main criteria for 
their selection.  Managers and operatives alike should ensure that tools and equipment 
and well maintained and replaced frequently. 
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